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In a sense, the study of comparative politics is the study of the role that context plays in 
structuring behavior. Institutional contexts, such as the nature of the electoral system or the 
existence of an independent judiciary, drive differences in electoral outcomes or in human rights 
across nations. Individual-level contextual factors such as norms, culture, or ethnic or religious 
identity can be determinative in understanding when social movements will flourish, and which 
cleavages will lead to political parties or to ethnic strife. Variation in context leads to variation in 
political outcomes and behavior across peoples and across nations, and provides comparative 
politics with its richness. 
Context also leads to dissent among scholars, as we engage in internecine methodological 
warfare over the best way to understand the complexity induced via the inclusion of contextual 
factors in our theories and in our data (Mahoney and Goertz 2006). Quantitative approaches tend 
to look broadly but shallowly, effectively averaging across complexity in order to make 
generalizations across cases. Qualitative approaches tend to look narrowly but deeply, yielding a 
weaker argument for generalization to other cases, but a stronger one for truly understanding the 
determinants of behavior in the case in question. Because practitioners of each methodological 
school require substantial training to be successful, there tends to be insufficient commonality 
between them, leading to less communication than would be ideal. 
Social networks and a relational approach to comparative politics promise a way to 
bridge the gap between scholars, to employ insights derived from deep qualitative study in cross-
national, quantitative analysis. This is made possible by the focus on a core, and often 
overlooked, contextual factor: the role that the structure of interactions between actors plays in 
understanding the behavior of individual actors, and, therefore, in understanding aggregate 
behavior as well. As this form of context is universal—humans are by nature social—the use of 
social networks minimizes the traveling problem (Sartori 1970). Networks may vary in 
importance by substantive topic and spatiotemporal setting, but their conceptualization is clear 
and constant: ties to one’s parents are ties to one’s parents, whatever the relevance of the ties. In 
this essay, I first discuss the use of social networks in general terms, focusing on the way in 
which relational analysis links the qualitative and the quantitative, the individual-level and the 
aggregate. Following this, I offer a series of four examples of the use of relational approaches in 
core problems in comparative politics to illustrate these points.1
Let us begin our general discussion with an important question: How might the promise 
offered by a relational approach be achieved? The key lies in identifying the appropriate level of 
analysis and the quality and availability of data given this level of analysis. To see how this 
might work, consider first individual-level analysis of behavior. The goal here is to understand 
the determinants of some choice or action, be it for whom or for what policy to vote, whether to 
turn out to vote or to protest, when or how much to alter a political opinion, and so on. There is a 
broad and growing empirical literature identifying the role that one’s social connections play in 
altering one’s beliefs and behavior across a variety of political activities (e.g., Huckfeldt and 
Sprague 1995; Leighley 1990; McAdam 1988; Petersen 2001; Sinclair 2009). The causal 
pathways underlying the effect of network connections are varied, and include: direct influence 
(Friedkin and Johnsen 1999), information transmission (Huckfeldt 2001; Lohmann1994; 
McClurg 2006), norms of fairness (Gould 1993), considerations of reputation (Gerber, Green, 
and Larimer 2008) or credibility (Granovetter 1978) or legitimacy (Opp and Gern 1993), 
 
                                                 
1 Franzese and Hays (2008) offer a complementary analysis of interdependence in comparative politics and 
examples in comparative political economy. 
strategic complementarities (Marwell and Oliver 1993), resource coordination (Verba, 
Schlozman, and Henry 1995), and safety in numbers (Kuran 1991). 
Though a few (e.g., complementarities, information) of these causal pathways 
particularly lend themselves to quantitative analysis (Jackson 2008), others (e.g., norms, 
legitimacy) require more case-specific knowledge to conceptualize and potentially quantify. This 
knowledge can only come from deep understanding of the sort of contextual factors that 
qualitative scholars have long identified as being important. Thus, when one desires to map out 
the network connections between people in cases in which one can expect norms, culture, 
identity, or emotion to drive behavior both directly and indirectly via the behavior of others, 
qualitative scholarship is a necessity. 
Once these connections are discerned, quantitative analysis becomes available. For 
example, one could include a simple measure of individual-level connectivity in cross-national 
regressions of comparative behavior. Given the strong dependence of behavior on network ties in 
the American context, even controlling for media effects (Mondak 1995), one would expect that 
connectivity would continue to prove an important explanatory variable when analyzing 
questions in comparative politics. This is assuming, of course, that networks are constructed that 
are appropriate to the case in question. Casual discussion networks may be the appropriate data 
from which to draw the independent variable of connectivity when political opinion formation is 
the behavior in question, but the same networks may not be appropriate when considering an 
action like protest in which participants take more risk upon themselves. In such cases the 
appropriate network may be strongly tied family and friends (McAdam 1988). Careful 
qualitative analysis is necessary to identify these important distinctions. 
Beyond the individual, extant scholarship on the properties of behavioral spread in a 
network can help translate these insights to the aggregate level. Scholars in this tradition detail 
how the degree of behavioral spread depends on such network characteristics as clustering, path 
length, connectivity, and the number of weak ties (e.g., Centola and Macy 2007; Fowler 2005; 
Gould 1993; Marwell and Oliver 1993; Rolfe 2005; Siegel 2009). A mapped-out network of 
relations allows one to employ these theoretical insights to produce predictions as to how a 
population of individuals within such a network behaves, given a particular distribution of 
individual incentives, and given a particular causal pathway driving changes in individual 
behavior. For example, a network with many weak ties (Granovetter 1973) is likely to be better 
at distributing information, allowing individuals to update policy beliefs, than it is at encouraging 
a risky collective action that relies on individual attention to norms of fairness or legitimacy 
(Centola and Macy 2007; Siegel 2009). We would therefore expect to see the presence of a 
network with many weak ties have more of an effect in the aggregate on opinion formation than 
on risky mass participation. Given network data, one can test these predictions by looking at the 
substantive effect of the aforementioned network characteristics on aggregate behavior in one’s 
regression analysis. 
As we can see, relational studies connect across several levels of analysis. Individual-
level data on discussion partners or movement ties can be used both to make predictions on 
behavior at the individual level, and to form a picture of network structure at the aggregate level. 
These structures are in turn predictors of aggregate-level behavior (Siegel 2009). That networks 
link levels of analysis implies they can be fertile ground for new questions. If one found, for 
example, that weak ties tended to be determinative in individual opinion, but support for a 
political party was strongest in regions in which few weak ties were present, this would suggest 
different causal mechanisms lie behind support for different parties, spurring further research. 
A fair criticism of this approach is its data-intensiveness. This approach may translate 
well to industrialized democracies, but even years of careful study in areas in which security is 
more of an issue are unlikely to produce much more than group-level information (Petersen 
2001). Without individual-level connectivity data, one cannot include connectivity as an 
individual-level variable in one’s cross-national regression. 
Network analysis, however, is flexible enough to produce additional insight even when 
data are comparatively poor. At the individual level, it may still be possible to discern the 
network of elite interconnectivity, given structured interactions within the halls of power. These 
data would provide for the same analysis as described earlier, though for an unrepresentative 
subset of the population. Given the influence of elites in these settings, though, the insight 
derived from this network analysis may very well be sufficient to make broad predictions in 
these cases. 
At the aggregate level, one does not require knowledge of every tie in the network in 
order to know the general type of the network. Siegel (2009) offers four such types: Small 
World, Opinion Leader, Village, and Hierarchy. Differences in expected aggregate behavior can 
be discerned across these types, given knowledge only of the types themselves. Even when 
detailed network data are sparse, qualitative data on network type—for example, do opinion-
leaders drive behavior, or is there more equality of influence across the network—can be 
employed to produce predictions. For example, Siegel (2010) provides an example using Patel’s 
(2005) ethnographic data to postdict the outcome of the January 2005 Iraqi Legislative elections. 
Thus, conditional on data availability and the level of analysis of the research question, 
network analysis and a relational approach to political science can not only produce useful and 
novel insights into comparative politics, but also allow for productive collaborations between 
qualitative and quantitative scholars, taking advantage of the techniques and insights of each. 
The remainder of this essay illustrates this point in a series of examples taken from core 
problems in comparative politics. 
 
Civic Culture, Democracy, and Democratic Performance: The first example is one in which a 
persuasive case has already been made for the inclusion of relational factors: that of the role of 
civic culture in enabling democracy and in delivering favorable democratic performance (Gibson 
2001). In seminal work, Putnam (1993) uses elite and mass surveys, detailed case studies, and 
historical analysis to posit that the difference in performance between the regional governments 
of northern and southern Italy lies in the superior degree of social capital present in the North. 
 This combination of quantitative and qualitative research, while raising additional 
questions (Tarrow 1996), provides an explanation for differences in democratic performance that 
generalizes. That is, given two otherwise identical cases, Putnam’s theory implies that the case 
exhibiting the most social capital will possess the better democratic performance, regardless of 
the other properties of the case. This is a falsifiable claim that requires the efforts of both 
quantitative and qualitative scholars to test. And it yields spillover claims as well. Social capital 
is fundamentally a relational concept, and independent of the system of government in place. 
Presumably, systems exhibiting greater social capital will have an easier time democratizing, and 
will have more successful democratic transitions. 
 This claim too is testable, but requires understanding what the relevant networks for 
democratization are, which in turn requires understanding what causal path translates social 
capital to democratization. Do strong friendship ties build legitimacy for group decision-making? 
If so, networks driven by opinion-leaders should produce less of the relevant social capital. Or 
does social capital aid in coordination, smoothing the transition? If so, the opposite conclusion 
on opinion-leaders may be true. Regardless, a relational approach seems essential to 
understanding opinion formation in groups, implying that is also essential to understanding the 
development of civic culture and its role in promoting democracy. 
 
Social Movements: A second area of comparative politics in which a relational approach has 
already been applied to positive effect is that of social movements. Participation in a movement 
is a frequently risky action that depends fundamentally on the behavior of others. Kuran (1991) 
and Lohmann (1994) describe two different causal pathways that lead to a strong role for 
interdependence in decision-making in determining whether or not participation in a social 
movement rises to a level sufficient to induce change in the government; they illustrate their 
theories with the Eastern European revolutions of 1989. Though these authors largely treat an 
individual’s response to aggregate behavior, explicit consideration of social networks can be 
added to the core dynamic of their models. For instance, Siegel (2009, 2010) explores 
participation in costly collective actions within networks, both with and without the sort of 
repression nascent movements often elicit. 
 Without the inclusion of social networks, extant work often fails to provide strong causal 
pathways underlying aggregate behavior, and is potentially subject to selection bias (Siegel 
2009). Including networks requires a combination of qualitative and quantitative approaches, as 
seen in McAdam’s (1988) study of Mississippi’s Freedom Summer. Doing so, however, would 
let us address important questions such as the relationship between repression and dissent (c.f. 
Davenport 2007), which fundamentally relies on not only one’s own response to repression, but 
also on one’s response to relevant others’ repression, and on one’s response to others’ responses. 
 
Social Cleavages, Party Systems, and Civil Strife: Though very different substantively, 
literatures on the development of party systems and on the potential for civil strife both are 
predicated on the importance of the structure of the cleavages present in society. Parties are 
organizations intended to represent the interests of one or more segments of the population, 
distinguished by membership in one or more social cleavages, and strife occurs often across the 
boundaries of cleavages. Yet conceptions of individual identity, and the cleavages they spawn, 
are fluid and socially constructed; this includes even race, ethnicity, and gender (e.g., Smedley 
2001; McCall and Dasgupta 2007). Relational approaches are thus a natural fit here, delineating 
the social pathways across which identity formation occurs (Block and Siegel 2008). 
 A better understanding of the social determinants of identity formation would endogenize 
the nature of the cleavages in society. In terms of party systems, not only would the relative sizes 
of identity groups affect which groups agglomerate into parties (Posner 2005), but party 
membership could feed back into identity choice, leading to variation in party strength over time. 
In terms of civil strife, group identity could shift with migratory patterns and the concomitant 
alteration in network structure, producing changes over time in the degree to which ethnic 
enclaves are differentiated from the dominant group, which in turn could produce different 
aggregate outcomes under persecution. For example, immigration might produce dispersed 
enclaves of a particular ethnic group. With insufficient numbers or ties to the local power 
structure, the more successful immigrants will be those who forge new network connections to 
those outside their group, assimilating into the population. However, should immigration 
increase, more options are available. Assimilation could continue with perhaps more equal 
cultural exchange, or the ethnic group could be present in sufficient numbers to attain its own 
power base. This latter possibility would increase incentives for in-group social identification 
and differentiation from the dominant group. Which occurs will be a complex interplay of 
cultures and institutions that define the distribution of economic and political opportunities for 
the immigrants. The nature of individual relationships illustrates the significance of the social 
cleavages, which helps dictate the likelihood of civil strife in the aggregate. 
 
Legislative Behavior and Government Formation: As a last example, consider networks 
encompassing a smaller set of individuals: those describing the connections and interactions 
between members of legislative bodies. In recent years, scholars have mapped out the networks 
connecting members of the American Congress, and have begun using these data to describe 
how the members of Congress introduce and pass legislation (Cho and Fowler 2010). While co-
sponsorship data of the sort used to create networks in Congress may not be as easily available 
in, for instance, parliamentary systems, this does not imply that other forms of networks are not 
in place, or that these networks do not play a role in legislative behavior. For example, if the elite 
in government tend to come from a small number of schools—Oxbridge in the UK, for 
example—friendship and associative networks may be discerned via qualitative analysis, and the 
network so constructed may be used in quantitative analysis of legislative effectiveness. 
Parliamentary systems offer further opportunities for network analysis. The government 
formation process involves coalition building between parties representing a diverse set of 
interests. With multiple parties in play, decision-making can be quite complicated. Among other 
things, in order to form the most beneficial coalitions, party leaders require information about the 
interests and the willingness to bargain of other parties’ leaders. This information is likely to be 
differentially available across parties, and which information is accessible will depend in part on 
the prior interactions between the parties’ leaders. Under this logic, both electoral and pre-
electoral (Golder 2006) coalitions should be more likely to form between parties connected via 
prior network ties, all else equal. Discernment of prior networks requires qualitative analysis, but 
the prediction is falsifiable and can be tested quantitatively. 
 
These four examples are only a sampling of ways in which a relational approach to 
comparative politics might prove useful in addressing core questions in the subfield. However, 
they do indicate the wealth of questions in comparative politics amenable to a relational 
approach, and provide new pathways for productive collaboration between scholars trained in 
qualitative and quantitative methodologies, and those studying behavior at the individual and the 
aggregate level Qualitative scholarship holds significant information on context, and this can be 
mined to elicit network connections, or at least network type. For instance, interviews that 
suggest most influence lies with a handful of individuals point to a potential Opinion Leader 
network, while those in which people refer largely only to members of their own group point to a 
potential Village network (Siegel 2009). At the same time, quantitative scholarship can use these 
relational data to draw conclusions across cases. Similarly, individual-level information on 
network ties can be used to develop and test aggregate-level hypotheses on the effect of network 
structure. This sort of cross-fertilization can only be a boon for the discipline. 
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